Coronavirus disease (COVID-19)

The current pandemic of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is unparalleled in recent history as are the social distancing interventions that have led to a considerable halt on the economic and social life of so many countries.

We aimed to generate empirical evidence about which social distancing measures had the most impact in reducing case counts and mortality.

We report a quasi-experimental (observational) study of the impact of various interventions for control of the outbreak through 24 April 2020. Chronological data on case numbers and deaths were taken from the daily published figures by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and dates of initiation of various control strategies from the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation website and published sources. Our complementary analyses were modelled in R using Bayesian generalised additive mixed models and in STATA using multilevel mixed-effects regression models.

From both sets of modelling, we found that closure of education facilities, prohibiting mass gatherings and closure of some non-essential businesses were associated with reduced incidence whereas stay-at-home orders and closure of additional non-essential businesses was not associated with any independent additional impact.

Our findings are that schools and some non-essential businesses operating ‘as normal’ as well as allowing mass gatherings were incompatible with suppressing disease spread. Closure of all businesses and stay at home orders are less likely to be required to keep disease incidence low. Our results help identify what were the most effective non-pharmaceutical interventions in this period.

Essential health services, including for tuberculosis (TB), are being affected by public health and social measures (PHSM) introduced to control COVID-19. In many settings, TB resources, facilities and equipment are being redirected towards COVID-19 response.

We sought to assess the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on TB services in the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region.

The fifty-three European Region Member States were asked to report qualitative and quantitative data in quarter one and two (Q1 and Q2) 2020. TB notifications were triangulated with the severity score on domestic movement restrictions to assess how they may have influenced TB detection.

Twenty-nine countries reported monthly TB notifications for the first half of 2019 and 2020. TB notifications decreased by 35.5% during Q2 2020 compared with Q2 2019, which is six-fold more than the average annual decrease of 5.1% documented during 2015–2019. The number of patients enrolled in rifampicin-resistant/multidrug-resistant TB treatment also decreased dramatically in Q2 2020, by 33.5%. The highest movement restriction severity score was observed between April and May 2020, which coincided with the highest observed decrease in TB notifications.

A decrease in TB detection and enrolment to treatment may cause increases in TB burden and threatens the Region’s ability to reach the TB targets of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, still this might be mitigated with rapid restoration of TB services and the implementation of targeted interventions during periods with severe PHSM in place, such as those introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In mid-March 2020, a range of public health and social measures (PHSM) against the then new coronavirus disease (COVID-19) were implemented in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

We analysed the development of influenza cases during the implementation of PHSM against SARS-CoV-2 in the Scandinavian countries.

Based on the established national laboratory surveillance of influenza, we compared the number of human influenza cases in the weeks immediately before and after the implementation of SARS-CoV-2 PHSM by country. The 2019/20 influenza season was compared with the five previous seasons.

A dramatic reduction in influenza cases was seen in all three countries, with only a 3- to 6-week duration from the peak of weekly influenza cases until the percentage dropped below 1%. In contrast, in the previous nine influenza seasons, the decline from the seasonal peak to below 1% of influenza-positive samples took more than 10 weeks.

The PHSM against SARS-CoV-2 were followed by a dramatic reduction in influenza cases, indicating a wider public health effect of the implemented measures.

As SARS-CoV-2 disproportionately affects adults, the COVID-19 pandemic vaccine response will rely on adult immunisation infrastructures.

To assess adult immunisation programmes in World Health Organization (WHO) Member States.

We evaluated country reports from 2018 on adult immunisation programmes sent to WHO and UNICEF. We described existing programmes and used multivariable regression to identify independent factors associated with having them.

Of 194 WHO Member States, 120 (62%) reported having at least one adult immunisation programme. The Americas and Europe had the highest proportions of adult immunisation programmes, most commonly for hepatitis B and influenza vaccines (> 47% and > 91% of countries, respectively), while Africa and South-East Asia had the lowest proportions, with < 11% of countries reporting adult immunisation programmes for hepatitis B or influenza vaccines, and none for pneumococcal vaccines. In bivariate analyses, high or upper-middle country income, introduction of new or underused vaccines, having achieved paediatric immunisation coverage goals and meeting National Immunisation Technical Advisory Groups basic functional indicators were significantly associated (p < 0.001) with having an adult immunisation programme. In multivariable analyses, the most strongly associated factor was country income, with high- or upper-middle-income countries significantly more likely to report having an adult immunisation programme (adjusted odds ratio: 19.3; 95% confidence interval: 6.5–57.7).

Worldwide, 38% of countries lack adult immunisation programmes. COVID-19 vaccine deployment will require national systems for vaccine storage and handling, delivery and waste management to target adult risk groups. There is a need to strengthen immunisation systems to reach adults with COVID-19 vaccines.

Children’s role in SARS-CoV-2 epidemiology remains unclear. We investigated an initially unnoticed SARS-CoV-2 outbreak linked to schools in northern France, beginning as early as mid-January 2020.

This retrospective observational study documents the extent of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, linked to an affected high school (n = 664 participants) and primary schools (n = 1,340 study participants), in the context of unsuspected SARS-CoV-2 circulation and limited control measures.

Between 30 March and 30 April 2020, all school staff, as well as pupils and their parents and relatives were invited for SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing and to complete a questionnaire covering symptom history since 13 January 2020.

In the high school, infection attack rates were 38.1% (91/239), 43.4% (23/53), and 59.3% (16/27), in pupils, teachers, and non-teaching staff respectively vs 10.1% (23/228) and 12.0% (14/117) in the pupils’ parents and relatives (p < 0.001). Among the six primary schools, three children attending separate schools at the outbreak start, while symptomatic, might have introduced SARS-CoV-2 there, but symptomatic secondary cases related to them could not be definitely identified. In the primary schools overall, antibody prevalence in pupils sharing classes with symptomatic cases was higher than in pupils from other classes: 15/65 (23.1%) vs 30/445 (6.7%) (p < 0.001). Among 46 SARS-CoV-2 seropositive pupils < 12 years old, 20 were asymptomatic. Whether past HKU1 and OC43 seasonal coronavirus infection protected against SARS-CoV-2 infection in 6–11 year olds could not be inferred.

Viral circulation can occur in high and primary schools so keeping them open requires consideration of appropriate control measures and enhanced surveillance.

Standard testing for infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is based on RT-PCR tests, but detection of viral genetic material alone does not indicate ongoing infectious potential. The ability to isolate whole virus represents a better proxy for infectivity.

The objective of this study was to gain an understanding of the current literature and compare the reported periods of positive SARS-CoV-2 detection from studies that conducted RT-PCR testing in addition to experiments isolating whole virus.

Using a rapid review approach, studies reporting empirical data on the duration of positive RT-PCR results and/or successful viral isolation following SARS-CoV-2 infection in humans were identified through searches of peer-reviewed and pre-print health sciences literature. Articles were screened for relevance, then data were extracted, analysed, and synthesised.

Of the 160 studies included for qualitative analysis, 84% (n = 135) investigated duration of positive RT-PCR tests only, 5% (n = 8) investigated duration of successful viral isolations, while 11% (n = 17) included measurements on both. There was significant heterogeneity in reported data. There was a prolonged time to viral clearance when deduced from RT-PCR tests compared with viral isolations (median: 26 vs 9 days).

Findings from this review support a minimum 10-day period of isolation but certain cases where virus was isolated after 10 days were identified. Given the extended time to viral clearance from RT-PCR tests, future research should ensure standard reporting of RT-PCR protocols and results to help inform testing policies aimed at clearance from isolation.

Children have a low rate of COVID-19 and secondary severe multisystem inflammatory syndrome (MIS) but present a high prevalence of symptomatic seasonal coronavirus infections.

We tested if prior infections by seasonal coronaviruses (HCoV) NL63, HKU1, 229E or OC43 as assessed by serology, provide cross-protective immunity against SARS-CoV-2 infection.

We set a cross-sectional observational multicentric study in pauci- or asymptomatic children hospitalised in Paris during the first wave for reasons other than COVID (hospitalised children (HOS), n = 739) plus children presenting with MIS (n = 36). SARS-CoV-2 antibodies directed against the nucleoprotein (N) and S1 and S2 domains of the spike (S) proteins were monitored by an in-house luciferase immunoprecipitation system assay. We randomly selected 69 SARS-CoV-2-seropositive patients (including 15 with MIS) and 115 matched SARS-CoV-2-seronegative patients (controls (CTL)). We measured antibodies against SARS-CoV-2 and HCoV as evidence for prior corresponding infections and assessed if SARS-CoV-2 prevalence of infection and levels of antibody responses were shaped by prior seasonal coronavirus infections.

Prevalence of HCoV infections were similar in HOS, MIS and CTL groups. Antibody levels against HCoV were not significantly different in the three groups and were not related to the level of SARS-CoV-2 antibodies in the HOS and MIS groups. SARS-CoV-2 antibody profiles were different between HOS and MIS children.

Prior infection by seasonal coronaviruses, as assessed by serology, does not interfere with SARS-CoV-2 infection and related MIS in children.

A multi-tiered surveillance system based on influenza surveillance was adopted in the United Kingdom in the early stages of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) epidemic to monitor different stages of the disease. Mandatory social and physical distancing measures (SPDM) were introduced on 23 March 2020 to attempt to limit transmission.

To describe the impact of SPDM on COVID-19 activity as detected through the different surveillance systems.

Data from national population surveys, web-based indicators, syndromic surveillance, sentinel swabbing, respiratory outbreaks, secondary care admissions and mortality indicators from the start of the epidemic to week 18 2020 were used to identify the timing of peaks in surveillance indicators relative to the introduction of SPDM. This timing was compared with median time from symptom onset to different stages of illness and levels of care or interactions with healthcare services.

The impact of SPDM was detected within 1 week through population surveys, web search indicators and sentinel swabbing reported by onset date. There were detectable impacts on syndromic surveillance indicators for difficulty breathing, influenza-like illness and COVID-19 coding at 2, 7 and 12 days respectively, hospitalisations and critical care admissions (both 12 days), laboratory positivity (14 days), deaths (17 days) and nursing home outbreaks (4 weeks).

The impact of SPDM on COVID-19 activity was detectable within 1 week through community surveillance indicators, highlighting their importance in early detection of changes in activity. Community swabbing surveillance may be increasingly important as a specific indicator, should circulation of seasonal respiratory viruses increase.

The Robert Koch Institute (RKI) managed the exchange of cross-border contact tracing data between public health authorities (PHA) in Germany and abroad during the early COVID-19 pandemic.

We describe the extent of cross-border contact tracing and its challenges.

We analysed cross-border COVID-19 contact tracing events from 3 February to 5 April 2020 using information exchanged through the European Early Warning Response System and communication with International Health Regulation national focal points. We described events by PHA, number of contacts and exposure context.

The RKI processed 467 events, initiating contact to PHA 1,099 times (median = 1; interquartile range (IQR): 1–2) and sharing data on 5,099 contact persons. Of 327 (70%) events with known exposure context, the most commonly reported exposures were aircraft (n = 64; 20%), cruise ships (n = 24; 7%) and non-transport contexts (n = 210; 64%). Cruise ship and aircraft exposures generated more contacts with authorities (median = 10; IQR: 2–16, median = 4; IQR: 2–11) and more contact persons (median = 60; IQR: 9–269, median = 2; IQR: 1–3) than non-transport exposures (median = 1; IQR: 1–6 and median = 1; IQR: 1–2). The median time spent on contact tracing was highest for cruise ships: 5 days (IQR: 3–9).

In the COVID-19 pandemic, cross-border contact tracing is considered a critical component of the outbreak response. While only a minority of international contact tracing activities were related to exposure events in transport, they contributed substantially to the workload. The numerous communications highlight the need for fast and efficient global outbreak communication channels between PHA.