Eurosurveillance - Volume 16, Issue 3, 20 January 2011

To enhance surveillance for influenza-like illness (ILI) in Denmark, a year-round electronic reporting system was established in collaboration with the Danish medical on-call service (DMOS). In order to achieve real-time surveillance of ILI, a checkbox for ILI was inserted in the electronic health record and a system for daily transfer of data to the national surveillance centre was implemented. The weekly number of all consultations in DMOS was around 60,000, and activity of ILI peaked in week 46 of 2009 when 9.5% of 73,723 consultations were classified as ILI. The incidence of ILI reached a maximum on 16 November 2009 for individuals between five and 24 years of age, followed by peaks in children under five years, adults aged between 25 and 64 years and on 27 November in senior citizens (65 years old or older). In addition to the established influenza surveillance system, this novel system was useful because it was timelier than the sentinel surveillance system and allowed for a detailed situational analysis including subgroup analysis on a daily basis.

Following the confirmation of the first two cases of pandemic influenza on 27 April 2009 in the United Kingdom (UK), syndromic surveillance data from the Health Protection Agency (HPA)/QSurveillance and HPA/NHS Direct systems were used to monitor the possible spread of pandemic influenza at local level during the first phase of the outbreak. During the early weeks, syndromic indicators sensitive to influenza activity monitored through the two schemes remained low and the majority of cases were travel-related. The first evidence of community spread was seen in the West Midlands region following a school-based outbreak in central Birmingham. During the first phase several Primary Care Trusts had periods of exceptional influenza activity two to three weeks ahead of the rest of the region. Community transmission in London began slightly later than in the West Midlands but the rates of influenza-like illness recorded by general practitioners (GPs) were ultimately higher. Influenza activity in the West Midlands and London regions peaked a week before the remainder of the UK. Data from the HPA/NHS Direct and HPA/QSurveillance systems were mapped at local level and used alongside laboratory data and local intelligence to assist in the identification of hotspots, to direct limited public health resources and to monitor the progression of the outbreak. This work has demonstrated the utility of local syndromic surveillance data in the detection of increased transmission and in the epidemiological investigation of the pandemic and has prompted future spatio-temporal work.

In the United Kingdom, the influenza A(H1N1)2009 pandemic had a distinct two-wave pattern of general practice consultations for influenza-like illness (ILI). We describe the epidemiology of the influenza pandemic in Wales between April and December 2009 using integrated data from a number of independent sources: GP surveillance, community virology surveillance, hospital admissions and deaths, and media enquiries monitoring. The first wave peaked in late July at 100 consultations per 100,000 general practice population and attracted intensive media coverage. The positivity rate for the A(H1N1)2009 influenza did not exceed 25% and only 44 hospitalisations and one death were recorded. By contrast, the second wave peaked in late October and although characterised by lower ILI consultation rates (65 consultations per 100,000 general practice population) and low profile media activity, was associated with much higher positivity rates for pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 (60%) and substantially more hospital admissions (n=379) and deaths (n=26). The large number of ILI-related consultations during the first wave in Wales probably reflected the intensive media activity rather than influenza virus circulating in the community. Data from community surveillance schemes may therefore have considerably overestimated the true incidence of influenza. This has implications for the future interpretation of ILI surveillance data and their use in policy making, and underlines the importance of using integrated epidemiological, virological and hospital surveillance data to monitor influenza activity.

During the first year of the influenza A(H1N1)2009 pandemic, unprecedented amounts of the neuraminidase inhibitors, predominantly oseltamivir, were used in economically developed countries for the treatment and prophylaxis of patients prior to the availability of a pandemic vaccine. Due to concerns about the development of resistance, over 1,400 influenza A(H1N1)2009 viruses isolated from the Asia-Pacific region during the first year of the pandemic (March 2009 to March 2010) were analysed by phenotypic and genotypic assays to determine their susceptibility to the neuraminidase inhibitors. Amongst viruses submitted to the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research in Melbourne, Australia, oseltamivir resistance was detected in 1.3% of influenza A(H1N1)2009 strains from Australia and 3.1% of strains from Singapore, but none was detected in specimens received from other countries in Oceania or south-east Asia, or in east Asia. The overall frequency of oseltamivir resistance in the Asia-Pacific region was 16 of 1,488 (1.1%). No zanamivir-resistant viruses were detected. Of the 16 oseltamivir-resistant isolates detected, nine were from immunocompromised individuals undergoing oseltamivir treatment and three were from immunocompetent individuals undergoing oseltamivir treatment. Importantly, four oseltamivir-resistant strains were from immunocompetent individuals who had not been treated with oseltamivir, demonstrating limited low-level community transmission of oseltamivir-resistant strains. Even with increased use of oseltamivir during the pandemic, the frequency of resistance has been low, with little evidence of community-wide spread of the resistant strains. Nevertheless, prudent use of the neuraminidase inhibitors remains necessary, as does continued monitoring for drug-resistant influenza viruses.

Understanding household transmission of the pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 virus, including risk factors for transmission, is important for refining public health strategies to reduce the burden of the disease. During the influenza season of 2009 we investigated transmission of the emerging virus in 595 households in which the index case was the first symptomatic case of influenza A(H1N1)2009. Secondary cases were defined as household contacts with influenza-like illness (ILI) or laboratory-confirmed influenza A(H1N1)2009, occurring at least one day after but within seven days following symptom onset in the index case. ILI developed in 231 of the 1,589 household contacts, a secondary attack rate of 14.5% (95% confidence interval (CI): 12.9-16.4). At least one secondary case occurred in 166 of the 595 households (a household transmission rate of 27.9%; 95% CI: 24.5-31.6). Of these, 127 (76.5%) households reported one secondary case and 39 (23.5%) households reported two or more secondary cases. Secondary attack rates were highest in children younger than five years (p=0.001), and young children were also more efficient transmitters (p=0.01). Individual risk was not associated with household size. Prophylactic antiviral therapy was associated with reduced transmission (p=0.03). The secondary attack rate of ILI in households with a confirmed pandemic influenza A(H1N1)2009 index case was comparable to that described previously for seasonal influenza.