Eurosurveillance - Volume 22, Issue 18, 04 May 2017

A new rapid assay for detecting oseltamivir resistance in influenza virus, iART, was used to test 149 clinical specimens. Results were obtained for 132, with iART indicating 41 as ‘resistant’. For these, sequence analysis found known and suspected markers of oseltamivir resistance, while no such markers were detected for the remaining 91 samples. Viruses isolated from the 41 specimens showed reduced or highly reduced inhibition by neuraminidase inhibition assay. iART may facilitate broader antiviral resistance testing.

This article uses the experience of five European countries to review the integrated approaches (human, animal and vector) for surveillance and monitoring of West Nile virus (WNV) at national and European levels. The epidemiological situation of West Nile fever in Europe is heterogeneous. No model of surveillance and monitoring fits all, hence this article merely encourages countries to implement the integrated approach that meets their needs. Integration of surveillance and monitoring activities conducted by the public health authorities, the animal health authorities and the authorities in charge of vector surveillance and control should improve efficiency and save resources by implementing targeted measures. The creation of a formal interagency working group is identified as a crucial step towards integration. Blood safety is a key incentive for public health authorities to allocate sufficient resources for WNV surveillance, while the facts that an effective vaccine is available for horses and that most infected animals remain asymptomatic make the disease a lesser priority for animal health authorities. The examples described here can support other European countries wishing to strengthen their WNV surveillance or preparedness, and also serve as a model for surveillance and monitoring of other (vector-borne) zoonotic infections.

In 2013, raw pork was the suspected vehicle of a large outbreak (n = 203 cases) of Salmonella Muenchen in the German federal state of Saxony. In 2014, we investigated an outbreak (n = 247 cases) caused by the same serovar affecting Saxony and three further federal states in the eastern part of Germany. Evidence from epidemiological, microbiological and trace-back investigations strongly implicated different raw pork products as outbreak vehicles. Trace-back analysis of S. Muenchen-contaminated raw pork sausages narrowed the possible source down to 54 pig farms, and S. Muenchen was detected in three of them, which traded animals with each other. One of these farms had already been the suspected source of the 2013 outbreak. S. Muenchen isolates from stool of patients in 2013 and 2014 as well as from food and environmental surface swabs of the three pig farms shared indistinguishable pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns. Our results indicate a common source of both outbreaks in the primary production of pigs. Current European regulations do not make provisions for Salmonella control measures on pig farms that have been involved in human disease outbreaks. In order to prevent future outbreaks, legislators should consider tightening regulations for Salmonella control in causative primary production settings.

Enhanced safety surveillance (ESS) was conducted in the United Kingdom and Finland for Vaxigrip and Intanza 15 µg to comply with the European Medicines Agency interim guidance aimed to detect any potential increase in reactogenicity in near real time following the annual update of the influenza vaccine strain composition. This pilot passive ESS was established to strengthen safety monitoring by facilitating spontaneous vaccinee reports and estimating near real-time vaccinee exposure. The primary objective was to estimate the reporting rates of suspected adverse reactions (ARs) occurring within 7 days post vaccination during the northern hemisphere 2015/16 influenza season. Among the Vaxigrip vaccinees (n = 1,012), 32 (3.2%) reported a total of 122 suspected ARs, including 110 suspected ARs that occurred within 7 days post vaccination. Among the Intanza 15 µg vaccinees (n = 1,017), 31 (3.0%) reported a total of 114 suspected ARs, including 99 that occurred within 7 days post-vaccination. These results were consistent with the known safety profile of the two vaccines and did not show any change in reactogenicity or safety concerns. This passive ESS showed improved data reporting and demonstrated its suitability to health authorities’ requirements; further fine tuning of the methodology is under discussion between all stakeholders.