Eurosurveillance - Volume 18, Issue 25, 20 June 2013

We report here new recombinants between the norovirus II.4 Sydney 2012 and the II.4 New Orleans 2009 variants. This demonstrates that the II.4 Sydney 2012 variant is undergoing further diversification and suggests a potential for rapid evolution. We also provide primers, which allow the amplification and sequencing of both the current New Orleans 2009 and Sydney 2012 variants and the new II.4 New Orleans 2009/II.4 Sydney 2012 recombinants for more accurate surveillance and transmission tracking.

To assess the distribution of specific antibodies against Leptospira spp. in Austrian adults, we conducted an explorative nationwide cross-sectional serological study in 400 healthy individuals. Antibody titres against Leptospira spp. were determined in a microscopic agglutination test using a panel of 14 serovar cultures. Sera of 18 participants were excluded because the samples were unsuitable for testing; the remaining 382 participants comprised 166 professional soldiers and 216 civilians. Overall, 88 (23%) individuals tested positive in serological screening. The subjects' sera reacted most frequently with serovars Canicola (16.5%) and Hardjo (11.8%). Epidemiological information was obtained from a questionnaire: no correlation was found for area of residence, travel abroad, regular outdoor activities, occupational animal contact, or ownership of companion animals. The proportion of seropositive samples was significantly lower among professional soldiers (15.7%) than among civilians (28.7%) (p=0.003). Our data demonstrate serological evidence of a high rate of exposure to Leptospira spp. among the Austrian population. No increased risk of exposure to Leptospira spp. was detected in military personnel.

A hybrid strain of enteroaggregative and Shiga toxin 2-producing Escherichia coli (EAEC-STEC) serotype O104:H4 strain caused a large outbreak of haemolytic uraemic syndrome and bloody diarrhoea in 2011 in Europe. Two surveys were performed in the European Union (EU) and European Economic Area (EEA) countries to assess their laboratory capabilities to detect and characterise this previously uncommon STEC strain. Prior to the outbreak, 11 of the 32 countries in this survey had capacity at national reference laboratory (NRL) level for epidemic case confirmation according to the EU definition. During the outbreak, at primary diagnostic level, nine countries reported that clinical microbiology laboratories routinely used Shiga toxin detection assays suitable for diagnosis of infections with EAEC-STEC O104:H4, while 14 countries had NRL capacity to confirm epidemic cases. Six months after the outbreak, 22 countries reported NRL capacity to confirm such cases following initiatives taken by NRLs and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) Food- and Waterborne Disease and Zoonoses laboratory network. These data highlight the challenge of detection and confirmation of epidemic infections caused by atypical STEC strains and the benefits of coordinated EU laboratory networks to strengthen capabilities in response to a major outbreak.

Control of acute communicable disease incidents demands rapid risk assessment, often with minimal peer-reviewed literature available but conducted in the public's view. This paper explores how methods of evidence-based medicine (EBM) can be applied in this scenario to improve decision making and risk communication. A working group with members from EBM organisations, public health institutions and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control used a six-stage framework for rapid risk assessments: preparation, risk detection/verification, risk assessment, development of advice, implementation, and evaluation. It concluded that data from observational studies, surveillance and modelling play a vital role in the evidence base. However, there is a need to further develop protocols and standards, to perform, report and register outbreak investigations more systematically and rigorously, and to allow rapid retrieval of the evidence in emergencies. Lack of evidence for risk assessment and advice (usual for new and emerging diseases) should be made explicit to policy makers and the public. Priorities are to improve templates for reporting and assessing the quality of case and outbreak reports, apply grading systems to evidence generated from field investigations, improve retrieval systems for incident reports internationally, and assess how to communicate uncertainties of scientific evidence more explicitly. .