Eurosurveillance - Volume 15, Issue 33, 19 August 2010

Post-transfusion hepatitis A virus (HAV) infection worldwide is considered a sporadic event. An outbreak of HAV infection occurred in Latvia between the end of 2007 and throughout 2008 with more than 2,800 confirmed cases reported over a 13-month period (incidence of 123 per 100,000 population). The majority of reported HAV infection cases were in people over 18 years of age and in people living in the capital city, Riga. We estimated that the crude risk for HAV contamination of whole blood supplies in Riga between February and October 2008 ranged from 1.4 to 10.6per 10,000 donated units. In people under 40 years of age, the risk of receiving an infectious blood transfusion was more than 3.0 per 10,000 recipients between August and October 2008 during the peak of the outbreak. We conclude that there is a previously under-recognised impact of HAV on blood safety during widespread outbreaks of this disease. Estimating the risk of contamination of blood supplies during an infectious disease outbreak scenario is important for fine tuning risk assessments and potentially improving public health practices.

In 2002, the French Food Safety Agency drew attention to the lack of information on the prevalence of human cryptosporidiosis in the country. Two years later, the ANOFEL Cryptosporidium National Network (ACNN) was set up to provide public health authorities with data on the incidence and epidemiology of human cryptosporidiosis in France. Constituted on a voluntary basis, ACNN includes 38 hospital parasitology laboratories (mainly in university hospitals). Each laboratory is engaged to notify new cases of confirmed human cryptosporidiosis, store specimens (e.g. stools, duodenal aspirates or biopsies) and related clinical and epidemiological data, using datasheet forms. From January 2006 to December 2009, 407 cryptosporidiosis cases were notified in France and 364 specimens were collected. Of the notified cases, 74 were children under four years of age, accounting for 18.2%. HIV-infected and immunocompetent patients represented 38.6% (n=157) and 28% (n=114) of cases, respectively. A marked seasonal pattern was observed each year, with increased number of cases in mid to late summer and the beginning of autumn. Genotyping of 345 isolates from 310 patients identified C. parvum in 168 (54.2%) cases, C. hominis in 113 (36.4%) and other species in 29 (9.4%), including C. felis (n=15), C. meleagridis (n=4), C. canis (n=4), Cryptosporidium chipmunk genotype (n=1), Cryptosporidium rabbit genotype (n=1) and new Cryptosporidium genotypes (n=4). These data represent the first multisite report of laboratory-confirmed cases of cryptosporidiosis in France.

The United Kingdom (UK) has several national syndromic surveillance systems. The Health Protection Agency (HPA)/NHS Direct syndromic surveillance system uses pre-diagnostic syndromic data from a national telephone helpline, while the HPA/QSurveillance national surveillance system uses clinical diagnosis data extracted from general practitioner (GP)-based clinical information systems. Data from both of these systems were used to monitor a local outbreak of cryptosporidiosis that occurred following Cryptosporidium oocyst contamination of drinking water supplied from the Pitsford Reservoir in Northamptonshire, United Kingdom, in June 2008. There was a peak in the number of calls to NHS Direct concerning diarrhoea that coincided with the incident. QSurveillance data for the local areas affected by the outbreak showed a significant increase in GP consultations for diarrhoea and gastroenteritis in the week of the incident but there was no increase in consultations for vomiting. A total of 33 clinical cases of cryptosporidiosis were identified in the outbreak investigation, of which 23 were confirmed as infected with the outbreak strain. However, QSurveillance data suggest that there were an estimated 422 excess diarrhoea cases during the outbreak, an increase of about 25% over baseline weekly levels. To our knowledge, this is the first time that data from a syndromic surveillance system, the HPA/QSurveillance national surveillance system, have been able to show the extent of such a small outbreak at a local level. QSurveillance, which covers about 38% of the UK population, is currently the only GP database that is able to provide data at local health district (primary care trust) level. The Cryptosporidium contamination incident described demonstrates the potential usefulness of this information, as it is unusual for syndromic surveillance systems to be able to help monitor such a small-scale outbreak.