Eurosurveillance - Volume 10, Issue 3, 01 March 2005

The US cases of anthrax in 2001 and the recent severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak have heightened the need for preparedness and response to naturally emerging and re-emerging infections or deliberately released biological agents. This report describes the response model of the Istituto Nazionale per le Malattie Infettive Lazzaro Spallanzani (INMI), Rome, Italy for managing patients suspected of or affected by smallpox or viral haemorrhagic fever (VHF) either in the context of an intentional release or natural occurrence. The INMI is Italy’s leading hospital in its preparedness and response plan to bioterrorism-related infectious agents. All single and double rooms of INMI are equipped with negative air pressure, sealed doors, high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and a fully-equipped anteroom; moreover, a dedicated high isolation unit with a laboratory next door for the initial diagnostic assays is available for admission of sporadic patients requiring high isolation. For patient transportation, two fully equipped ambulances and two stretcher isolators with a negative pressure section are available. Biomolecular and traditional diagnostic assays are currently performed in the biosafety level 3/4 (BSL 3/4) laboratories. Continuing education and training of hospital staff, consistent application of infection control practices, and availability of adequate personnel protective equipment are additional resources implemented for the care of highly infectious patients and to maintain the readiness of an appropriately trained workforce to handle large scale outbreaks.

During the SARS epidemic, many patients were screened according to WHO criteria but never went on to develop SARS. In May 2003, early in the epidemic, we conducted a retrospective study to describe suspected SARS patients hospitalised in France and compared them with documented cases of patients with SARS to evaluate the screening strategy. A total of 117 patients were studied. Only 3.4% had been in close contact with a SARS patient but 73.5% came from an affected area. 67.5% had fever and respiratory symptoms on their admission to hospital. 49.6% had fever and non specific symptoms. Clinical symptoms that were significantly more common among patients with SARS were fever, myalgia, dyspnoea, and nausea or vomiting. Presumed viral fever and respiratory tract infection were the most common diagnosis. Symptoms cannot be distinguished from an early stage of SARS confirming the usefulness of the WHO case definitions in isolation decision to avoid further transmission.

Respiratory virus activity is detected in Europe each winter, yet the precise timing and size of this activity is highly unpredictable. The impact of influenza infection and/or acute respiratory infection in European countries is continuously monitored through a variety of surveillance systems. All of these sources of information are used to assess the nature and extent of activity of influenza and other respiratory viruses, and to offer guidance on the prevention and control of morbidity and mortality due to influenza at a local, national and international level. The early warning system for a forthcoming influenza epidemic is mainly based on the use of a set of thresholds. In the Czech Republic, the acute respiratory infection (ARI) reporting system, with automated data processing, uses a statistical model for the early detection of unusual increased rates of the monitored indicators. The collected data consists of the number of ARI, the number of complications due to ARI and the population registered with the reporting general practitioners and paediatricians, all collected separately in five age groups. To improve the reporting system in the Czech Republic, clinical data on the weekly incidence of influenza-like illness (ILI) within the same population and the same age groups was started in January 2004. These data fit the European Commission’s recently adopted ILI case definition and allows a better comparison of data with other countries in Europe, in particular those participating in EISS (European Influenza Surveillance Scheme).

Reliable data on the health status of migrant seasonal workers in Europe is scarce. Access to public health care for this population depends on national regulations, and their legal status in host countries. In this manuscript we describe a case study of a salmonellosis outbreak that occurred in Norway, and highlight the difficulties encountered in applying control measures in a population of seasonal migrant farm workers. Surveillance and control of infectious diseases need to be supported by legislation which makes implementation of control measures possible. Efforts have been made to improve the rights for migrants in Europe with regard to healthcare, but seasonal migrant workers still remain largely outsiders where these measures are concerned. Special attention should be given to this disadvantaged group in terms of social rights and healthcare. Preparedness plans should be improved to deal with contagious pathogens involving the seasonal migrant population.

A survey of the prevalence of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) of O157 serotype in foodstuffs of animal origin (beef, veal, pork, chicken, fish) from 1999 to 2003 in Belgium was performed. STEC strains were only isolated from beef with a prevalence of 0.73%. This percentage is low in comparison with the prevalence in other countries. Among the 76 isolated STEC O157 strains, 75% belonged to the serotype O157:H7 and 25% to the serotype O157 non H7. Moreover, the most frequent pathotype was eae stx2 ehxA (74%).

We note with interest the recently published guidelines for management of melioidosis and glanders. We are clinicians with extensive experience with melioidosis in Australia and Thailand and would like to express our concern at a number of inaccuracies in these guidelines.